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Tobacco Market (tobacco + market)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting50%

Selected Abstracts

CHINA BANS FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TOBACCO MARKET

ADDICTION, Issue 5 2005
Article first published online: 22 APR 200
No abstract is available for this article. [source]

Taming the tigers: the case for controlling the tobacco market

ADDICTION, Issue 5 2004
RON BORLAND PhD Co-Director
No abstract is available for this article. [source]

THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON TOBACCO ADVERTISING STRATEGIES

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2010
Caroline Elliott
C32; I18; L66; M37 ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the very limited literature examining the factors determining tobacco companies' advertising strategies. The paper explores whether firms in the UK tobacco market significantly changed their advertising expenditure in the face of proposed changes to the UK and European Commission tobacco advertising legislation. The results suggest that changes in legislation have little impact on firms' advertising strategies for existing brands, but that legislative changes impact upon product launch dates. Our results also offer some information on the nature of firm interdependencies in the UK tobacco industry. [source]

Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple markets

AGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 1 2007
Kellie Curry Raper
Traditional market power analyses of the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry consider monopoly power exertion by manufacturers in selling cigarettes to consumers. Market characteristics combined with government policy make it plausible that manufacturers exert monopsony market power in procuring tobacco. We investigate this possibility in the U.S. and international tobacco markets by extending nonparametric tests to include simultaneously potential monopoly market power with potential monopsony market power in multiple input markets, allowing both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. We use annual data from the cigarette manufacturing industry from 1977 to 1993. Results indicate substantial departures from competitive pricing in the procurement of domestic tobacco, supporting the postulate that cigarette manufacturers appropriate monopsony rents despite, and perhaps at times through, U.S. tobacco farm policy. Results are less clear with respect to monopsony market power exertion in imported leaf tobacco procurement by cigarette manufacturers. Finally, results indicate that monopoly market power exertion is relatively small and that, when the possibility of monopsony market power exertion is admitted, monopoly market power exertion is no longer problematic.[EconLit citations: L100, L660]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 35,55, 2007. [source]