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Supreme Court Justices (supreme + court_justice)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences60%

Selected Abstracts

Tribute to Justice Souter

JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY, Issue 1 2010
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR
When the U.S. Supreme Court Justices took their seats at the beginning of the 2009 Term, the Bench looked different. Gone from the Bench, after nineteen years, was David H. Souter. He returned to his home in New Hampshire, a state he likes enormously. Justice Souter will be missed by his former colleagues and by advocates before the Court, by legal scholars nationwide and by all who follow the Court's work and activities. [source]

Follow-up: ADR domains sell in pre-auction deal

ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Issue 6 2007
Russ Bleemer
Follow-ups on April items: Two primary ADR domains each sold for six-figure sums, though the ADR provider/listings company that they previously supported is still on the market. And two more U.S. Supreme Court justices include testimony before a Congressional committee on ADR luring judges away from the bench to support their calls for higher pay [source]

The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2009
Tom S. Clark
A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial-congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court-curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self-restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court. [source]

POISSON VERSUS BINOMIAL: APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF STATISTICS, Issue 3 2010
Vassilly Voinov
Summary The problem of discriminating between the Poisson and binomial models is discussed in the context of a detailed statistical analysis of the number of appointments of the U.S. Supreme Court justices from 1789 to 2004. Various new and existing tests are examined. The analysis shows that both simple Poisson and simple binomial models are equally appropriate for describing the data. No firm statistical evidence in favour of an exponential Poisson regression model was found. Two attendant results were obtained by simulation: firstly, that the likelihood ratio test is the most powerful of those considered when testing for the Poisson versus binomial and, secondly, that the classical variance test with an upper-tail critical region is biased. [source]

TORT DECISIONS AND CAMPAIGN DOLLARS

POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 2 2000
Eric N. Waltenburg
There has recently been growing concern over the massive infusion of special interest dollars in state judicial elections. Commentators worry that these contributions may undermine the public's confidence in the operation and impartiality of the judicial system, or worse, "buy" the decision of the successful judicial candidate. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which there is good cause to worry. It examines contribution patterns for, and the decisional behavior of, the state supreme court justices on the Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio courts who have had electoral contests in the 1990s. Results indicate that worries over the American bench being "for sale" have some traction. Under electoral pressures, the justices do appear to position themselves to appeal more to their contributors. This effect is not enduring, however. Whatever relationships exist between contributions to judicial candidates and their decisional behavior are short-term. Following his or her election, a justice's decision-making shows no signs of being influenced by interest group contributions. [source]