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Independent Commission (independent + commission)
Selected AbstractsPatterns of Policing and Policing PattenJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2000Paddy Hillyard In September 1999 the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, chaired by Chris Patten, published its recommendations. This article examines the political context of policing reform, the contents of the report and the rejection of its core ideas in the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill published in May 2000. The central argument of the paper is that the Commission's radical model of policing , a network of regulating mechanisms in which policing becomes everyone's business , failed, because it gave insufficient attention, like much modern writing on policing, to the role of the state and the vested interests within policing. The overall outcome is that the Patten Commission has been effectively policed and Northern Ireland will be left with a traditional, largely undemocratic and unaccountable model of policing with most of the control resting with the Secretary of State and the Chief Constable. [source] Corruption, Culture and Transferability: What Can Be Learned From Australia?JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2001Peter Larmour The Asian financial crisis is often blamed on ,corruption'. International banks and aid donors now promote technical assistance and training in corruption prevention, referring to the international best practice of Independent Commissions Against Corruption in Hong Kong or Sydney. However, it is often also argued that what counts as corruption is culturally specific, and that the incidence of petty corruption is related to low salaries. So lessons drawn from corruption prevention in Australia, for example, may not be transferable to other countries with different cultures and levels of income. This paper reflects on the experience of designing and teaching a course on corruption prevention for officials from developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It considers what counts as ,corruption', identifies different approaches towards prevention, and draws some conclusions about the transferability of Australian expertise. [source] 2162: New aspects of the Slug Mucosal Irritation (SMI) assay: Detecting ocular stinging, itching and burning sensationsACTA OPHTHALMOLOGICA, Issue 2010J LENOIR Purpose Our eyes are one of the most important senses. They are very sensitive and irritations may occur easily. A screening method for ocular discomfort would be very helpful in the development and refinement of formulations. In the past, the Slug Mucosal Irritation (SMI) assay demonstrated a relation between an increased mucus production (MP) in slugs and an elevated incidence of stinging, itching and burning (SIB) in human eyes. The aim of this study is to compare subjective ocular discomfort caused by shampoos evaluated in volunteers with results of the SIB-procedure. Methods The stinging potency of 1 artificial tear and 10 shampoos was evaluated with the SIB-procedure by placing 3 slugs per treatment group 3 times on 100 µl of the test item. After each 15 min contact period, MP was measured. Evaluation of the results is based upon the total MP during 3 repeated contact periods. Experiments were repeated 3 times. A Human Eye Irritation test with the same test items will be set up (12-period cross-over study, 24 volunteers, study approved by an independent Commission for Medical Ethics, associated with Ghent University Hospital). The participants are dripped 10 µl of a 5% or 10% shampoo dilution in water or the artificial tear in 1 eye, while in the other eye 10 µl of water is administered. The evaluation of the test substances is done both by participants and the ophthalmologist at several time points. Conclusion With the obtained results we will be able to improve the newly developed protocol and examine the predictability with reference to non- and mildly irritating formulations in humans. We hope to conclude that the SIB-procedure is a good tool to predict clinical ocular discomfort. [source] Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed PolityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico Majone It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation-of-powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ,mixed government',a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ,estates' representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation-of-powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule-making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ,regulatory estate'. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need. [source] | ||||||||||